The relationship between China and Taiwan is more stable in 2009 than it has been in years, but China has nonetheless not renounced its “right” to use force to forestall Taiwan's “independence”.

At the same time, the cross-strait military balance is shifting in ways that are problematic for Taiwan's defense: The growing size and quality of China's missile arsenal, along with other advances in Chinese military capabilities, call into question the United States' and Taiwan's ability to defend the island against a large-scale Chinese attack.

In this volume, the authors employ a mix of theater-level combat modeling, simpler mathematical models, historical analysis, interviews with experts, and qualitative judgment to evaluate both the China-Taiwan political dynamic and the cross-strait military balance. Shlapak et al. conclude with a discussion of how Taiwan might be successfully defended against a Chinese invasion attempt.

SUMMARY
The military balance across the Taiwan Strait is changing in ways that make more complex both the set of operational challenges associated with defending Taiwan against a possible Chinese attack and the strategic imperative of shaping Chinese behavior so that no such attack ever occurs.

This report documents a follow-on effort to one published in 2000 (Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, 2000), reassessing and expanding that earlier study’s snapshot of the cross-strait balance, looking ahead to the 2010–2015 period. As in the 2000 study, we employed a mix of theaterlevel combat modeling, simpler mathematical models, historical analysis, interviews with experts, and qualitative judgment. The conclusions of the present work have proven to be substantially less optimistic for the Taiwan (and U.S.) side. ...

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David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, Toy I. Reid,
Murray Scot Tanner, Barry Wilson
Prepared for the Smith Richardson Foundation
NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION

PREFACE
This paper is the final report of a project titled “The Changing China-Taiwan Military Balance,” which evaluated key aspects of the China-Taiwan military balance looking out toward 2015. The study addressed four key questions:

• How are the political dynamics of the cross-strait relationship changing, and how could those changes affect perceptions of the military balance?
• How effective might China’s growing force of short-range ballistic missiles be in attacking key military targets on Taiwan, such as air bases?
• How have changes in Chinese military capabilities changed the likely outcome of a possible contest for air superiority over the strait and Taiwan itself?
• In the light of the above, how can Taiwan be successfully defended against a Chinese invasion attempt?

This report should be of interest to military, government, and civilian planners, analysts, and scholars working on issues relating to the Taiwan Strait situation, Chinese military modernization, and U.S. military force planning and strategy in the Western Pacific.

This research was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations.

CONTENTS
Chapter One
Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A Caveat.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter Two
Changing Cross-Strait Political Dynamics.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Beijing’s Attitude Toward the Status Quo: Will Patience Remain a
Virtue?... . . . 6
The Effects of Cross-Strait Economic Integration.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Mainland Sanctions Against Imports from Taiwan .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Disruption, Damage, or Sabotage of Financial Markets or
Information Networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Selective Harassment or Intimidation of Taiwanese Businesspeople .. . . . . 12
Taiwan’s Evolving National Identity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Legacy of Chen Shui-bian. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Politics of the Shifting Cross-Strait Military Balance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Security Implications of the Changing Political Landscape.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Dangers of Disappointment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 28
Chapter Three
Missiles over the Strait: China’s Short-Range Ballistic Missile
Force.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
China’s Short-Range Ballistic Missile Force.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A Simplifying Assumption.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Air Base Attack.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Cutting Runways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Hangars/Maintenance Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Attacking Aircraft Parked in the Open.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Air Base Attack Observations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Concluding Observations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Chapt er Four
Assessing the Air War.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Analytic Approach and Scenario Variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Chinese Aircrew Quality.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Chinese Air Operations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Defenses Against Chinese PGMs.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Blue Sortie Generation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
ROC SAM Survivability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Shelters at Blue Bases.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
U.S. Forces Engaged.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Laying Out the Scenario Space.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Character of the Air War.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
The Base Case Battle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Measures of Merit.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Overall Outcomes and Driving Factors.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chinese Air Force Modernization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Chinese Aircrew Quality.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Chinese Air Operations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Defenses Against Precision-Guided Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Taiwanese Air Force Modernization.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Blue Sortie Generation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
ROC SAM Survivability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Number of Shelters.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
U.S. Contributions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Concluding Remarks: Not Your Father’s Air War.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Sidebar: Would China Attack Japan?.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Chapter Five
The Ultimate Roll of the Dice: A Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.. . . . . . . . . . 91
The Last Campaign of the Civil War: PLA Amphibious Operations,
1949–1955. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
The Falklands Campaign: Amphibious Warfare in the Age of the
Antiship Missile.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Looking Forward: The Lessons of “Operation Corporate”.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Assessing the Odds: Could the Chinese Invade Taiwan?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Adding It Up: The Invasion Threat to Taiwan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Chapter Six
Implications, Conclusions, and Considerations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
The Political Backdrop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
The Fall of Shot: Of Warheads, Wreckage, and Will.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Unfriendly Skies: New Concepts Needed for New Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . 129
On the Beach: Defeating a Chinese Invasion .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Broadening the Scope: Implications for Other Scenario Variants.. . . . . . . . . 137
The Tyranny of Distance and the Longer Term .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A Question of Balance: Maintaining Equilibrium on the Strait.. . . . . . . . . . 141

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