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 Background: Escalation can be defined as an increase in the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or more of the participants. Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition.
When competition involves military confrontation or limited war, the pressure to escalate can become intense because of the weight of issues that bring actors into violent conflict and the potential costs of losing contests of deadly force. Escalation can be unilateral, but it is often reciprocal, as each combatant struggles ever harder to achieve victory or avoid defeat. Left unchecked, escalatory chain reactions can occur, raising the costs of war to catastrophic levels for combatants and noncombatants alike.
Cold War–era thinking about escalation focused on the dynamics of bipolar, superpower confrontation, and theories on how to manage it emerged as a branch of nuclear-deterrence literature. In that era, U.S. leaders could focus their attention on one principal adversary, the Soviet Union. Although the prospect of war with a nuclear superpower was frightening, anticipating and managing confrontations with Moscow was, in many ways, an easier task than those that U.S. leaders face today.
The current security environment is complicated by a wide range of threats that fall broadly into three interrelated but relatively distinct categories. Each of these threats entails a significant risk of escalation. First, the United States must remain prepared to manage potential confrontations with other large nuclear powers, such as Russia and, particularly, China. Second, the emergence of new nuclear-armed powers in regions in which the United States has important interests increases the risk of escalation in regional crises and challenges efforts to manage that risk should the United States choose to intervene.
Finally, there is a risk of escalation from a range of irregular warfare threats resulting from the decline or failure of state authority in several strategically important regions; from the rise of a violent, transnational Islamist movement; and from advances in information networks that have enabled an international nexus of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal groups hostile to the United States.
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Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Roger Cliff
Prepared for the United States Air Force
© Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation
Contents:
Preface.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Summary.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Acknowledgments.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii
Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv
Chapter One
Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Contemporary Challenges.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Purpose of This Monograph.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Organization and Approach.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter Two
The Nature of Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Understanding Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Thresholds and the Subjectivity of Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Limited War.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Escalation Dominance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Dimensions of Escalation: Vertical, Horizontal, and Political.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Escalation Mechanisms.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Deliberate Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Inadvertent Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Accidental Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Complexity in Escalation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Motives for Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Instrumental Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Suggestive Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Other Motives for Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Dynamics of Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Constraints on Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Escalation and Instability in the 21st Century.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
New Escalation Options.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Perceived Political Fragility.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Indifference to Escalation Risks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Anticipating and Managing Escalation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Chapter Three
China’s Thinking on Escalation: Evidence from Chinese Military
Writings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Background and Conceptual Issues.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Understanding Chinese Views on Escalation and War Control.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Conceptual Foundation of War Control.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Operationalizing War Control: Military Measures to Contain
Warfare.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Assessing Chinese Escalation Behavior Through the Lens of the
Second Artillery Doctrine .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Second Artillery Nuclear Operations and Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Key Nuclear Doctrine Concepts.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Additional Questions About Second Artillery Nuclear Operations.. . . . . . 65
Second Artillery Conventional Missile Strike Campaigns.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Implications for Chinese Escalation Behavior.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Chinese Views on Space Warfare and Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Conclusion.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Chapter Four
Regional Nuclear Powers.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 83
Escalation Risks Inherent in Emergent Nuclear Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Sources of Regional Instability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Instability and Risks of Escalation in Northeast Asia.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Instability and Escalation in South and Southwest Asia.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Risks of Escalation in the Ongoing Conflict Between India and
Pakistan.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Risks of Escalation Due to Domestic Instability in Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . 106
The Risks of Escalation in a Conflict with Iran.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Conclusion.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Chapter Five
Escalation in Irregular Warfare.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Irregular Warfare’s Many Paths of Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Escalation in Stability Operations: Two Illustrative Cases.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Multiple Actors in a Complex Strategic Environment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Multiple Conflicts Exist Simultaneously.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
ROE and the Challenge of Complexity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Dramatic Asymmetries of Power, Interest, and Commitment.. . . . . . . . . . 131
Irregular Warfare Undermines Traditional Escalation-
Management Approaches.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Escalation in the Global Jihad.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
The Roots of Global Jihad.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
The Escalation Dynamics of Global Jihad.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Escalation in Response to Global Jihad.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Escalation Management in the Struggle Against Global Jihad.. . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Strategies in the Global Jihad.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Managing the Escalatory Effects of Global Jihad.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Conclusion.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Chapter Six
Managing Escalation in a Complex World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
The First Step in Managing Escalation Is Understanding Its Nature.. . . . . 160
Deterring Deliberate Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Managing Inadvertent Escalation: A Matter of Clarifying
Thresholds .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Managing Forces to Avoid Accidental Escalation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Dominance as a Means of Escalation Management.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
The Role of Technology in Escalation and Escalation Management.. . . 168
Managing Escalation Risks in Today’s World.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Escalation Management in a Limited Conflict with China.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Managing Escalation in Confrontations with Other Regional
Nuclear Powers.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Escalation Management in Irregular Warfare.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Recommendations for the U.S. Air Force.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
APPENDIXES
A. China, Force, and Escalation: Continuities Between Historical
Behavior and Contemporary Writings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
B. Case Studies of Escalation in Stability Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
C. Modified Method for Delphi Analyses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Bibliography.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Preface:
The subject of escalation has received little attention in U.S. strategic thought since the end of the Cold War. With prospects of conflict between nuclear-armed superpowers receding in memory, few policymakers, security analysts, or military leaders have worried about the danger of wars spinning out of control or considered how to manage these risks.
Yet there are important reasons to examine the dynamics of escalation in the current security environment. Although the United States retains its nuclear superiority and has demonstrated the ability to project overwhelming force in most conventional conflicts, strategic conditions have changed considerably in the past 15 years, and new adversaries have emerged. These developments could find the United States in escalatory situations that its leaders, schooled in ideas developed during the Cold War, are ill equipped to anticipate or manage. Understanding escalation is particularly important to the U.S. Air Force because of its unique ability to strike deep within enemy territory and the emphasis in Air Force doctrine on rapid strategic attack to achieve shock, paralysis, and escalation dominance.
The Air Force recognizes the importance of understanding and managing the risks of escalation. In 2004, Director of Air Force Strategic Planning Major General Ronald J. Bath sponsored a war game in which uncontrolled escalation occurred, surprising players and controllers alike. Because this experience was just one in a series of escalatory events occurring in major war games over the past several years, General Bath recommended to Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper that the RAND Corporation be tasked to examine the risks of escalation in the current security environment and offer recommendations on how the Air Force can best anticipate and manage those risks. General Jumper approved the recommendation, and RAND Project AIR FORCE was tasked to conduct a study later titled “Managing Escalation in the Post–Cold War Security Environment.”
This monograph presents the findings of that study. It offers insights for air- and spacepower strategy and should also inform military operations and national security policy more generally. It builds on previous Project AIR FORCE work examining the risks of escalation and the potential impacts of U.S. policy in the current security environment: War and Escalation in South Asia, by John E. Peters, James Dickens, Derek Eaton, C. Christine Fair, Nina Hachigian, Theodore W. Karasik, Rollie Lal, Rachel M. Swanger, Gregory F. Treverton, and Charles Wolf, Jr., MG-367-1-AF, 2006, and Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy, by Karl P. Mueller, Jasen J. Castillo, Forrest E. Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, and Brian Rosen, MG-403-AF, 2006.
The research reported here was sponsored by the Director of Strategic Planning, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE.
RAND Project AIR FORCE:
RAND Project AIR FORCE, a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. RAND Project AIR FORCE provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Aerospace Force Development; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine.
Additional information about RAND Project AIR FORCE is available on our Web site: http://www.rand.org/paf/
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