The Department of State released today Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976.  This volume documents fluctuations in Sino-American relations, ranging from the euphoria lingering from President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, to the practical challenges of normalizing diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing.

Like all recent Foreign Relations volumes in the Nixon-Ford subseries, the emphasis of this volume is on policy formulation, rather than the implementation of policy or day-to-day diplomacy.  Influence on major U.S. foreign policy decisions was generally restricted to a small circle including the President, Henry Kissinger, and some influential officials they trusted. 

During this period, control over U.S. China policy shifted from the White House to the Department of State as a result of the Watergate crisis, the appointment of Kissinger as Secretary of State, the resignation of Nixon as President, and Kissinger’s involuntary resignation as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The chapters of this volume integrate documents about U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China and with Taiwan, reflecting the fact that the former government received much more attention from high-level American policymakers than did the latter. 

The central theme of the volume is the effort to strengthen and formalize the U.S.-PRC relationship, which had been established during 1971 and 1972 after decades of bitter estrangement, and the concurrent disestablishment of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, a task that remained unfinished at the end of the Ford Administration. 

The volume is divided into five chapters.  The first chapter, from January until May 1973, documents the establishment of unofficial liaison offices in Washington and Beijing, the most concrete achievement of the 1973–1976 period.  Both sides expressed their desire to normalize relations by 1976. In retrospect, however, Kissinger’s February 1973 visit to the People’s Republic of China proved to be the acme of Sino-American relations during these years. Although the United States and China agreed to finesse the Taiwan dispute and formed a tacit anti-Soviet alliance, the two countries did not agree on the war in Cambodia or the wisdom of détente with the Soviet Union. 

The second chapter, containing documents from June 1973 until August 1974, indicates that domestic politics in both countries threatened the still-fragile Sino-American relationship.  In China, aftershocks from the Cultural Revolution and the death of Lin Biao, as well as the aging of China’s leadership, raised doubts about the stability of Chinese foreign policy.  This chapter also reveals U.S. efforts to reassure Chinese leaders baffled by Watergate and fearful that American policy would become erratic.  In addition, China was dissatisfied with the pace of U.S. disengagement from formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 

Meanwhile, an early example of economic competition is revealed through the fears of U.S. textile manufacturers that they would be hurt by increased American trade with China.  The third chapter, with documents from September 1974 until July 1975, covers the Sino-American effort to re-establish the momentum toward normalization.  Along these lines, the United States attempted to reconcile the improvement of Sino-American relations with the preservation of Taiwanese security through such policies as a careful diminution of U.S.-Taiwanese military links.  Nonetheless, the United States and China continued to bicker over the subjects of détente and Cambodia.  The fourth chapter, which covers the period from August to December 1975, includes the planning for Ford’s trip to Beijing, and the details of the actual trip itself. 

China experts within the U.S. Government asserted that the President should attempt to normalize relations quickly, but Kissinger believed that such a policy would produce a right-wing backlash against Ford that would endanger the Administration’s effectiveness and reelection. 

The Chinese Government agreed to host Ford without a prior agreement for rapid normalization, and the visit maintained existing friendly relations, while breaking little new ground.  The final chapter, containing documents from January 1976 until January 1977, reveals how domestic political developments in both countries distracted policy makers from the Sino-American relationship.  By January 1977, the change of leadership in both countries had been so dramatic that there seemed little doubt that the Sino-American relationship was entering a new era. 

During these years, relations between the United States and China were conducted at the highest political level, which meant that incapacitation of the top leadership tended to bring progress to a standstill. 

More than most volumes in the Foreign Relations series, this one documents the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy.  However, despite numerous obstacles and failures, each country’s troubled relationship with the Soviet Union produced a continual impetus to improve the Sino-American relationship. (News Release)

Download Foreign Relations of the United States: China, 1973–1976

PDF format, 3.7MB, 1031Pages.

Editor David P. Nickles
General Editor Edward C. Keefer
United States Government Printing Office
Washington, 2008

Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI
Abbreviations and Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIX
Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXV
China, 1973–1976
Kissinger’s Visits to Beijing and the Establishment
of the Liaison Offices, January 1973–May 1973 . . . . . . . 1
Political Turmoil in the United States,
June 1973–September 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Move Toward Normalization of Relations,
October 1974–July 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 542
The Summit in Beijing, August–December 1975 . . . . . . . . 715
Chinese Domestic Power Struggles,
January 1976–January 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981

134. Memorandum of Conversation
Beijing, December 2, 1975, 4:10–6:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman Mao Tse Tung
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-P’ing
Vice Premier Li Hsien-Nien
Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Jai-Hung
Chang Han-chih, Interpreter, Deputy Director, MFA
Tang Weng-shen, Interpreter, Deputy Director, MFA
Nurse/Interpreter
President Gerald R. Ford
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office
Mr. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
Mr. Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

(At approximately 3:00 p.m. the Chinese informed the United States party that Chairman Mao wished to see President Ford. The President, his wife and daughter, and other members of the United States party left the President’s villa at 4:00 p.m. and drove to Chairman Mao’s residence through a front gate of the Forbidden City complex. They were greeted at the entrance to the residence by Vice Premier Teng and the other Chinese officials and were escorted into the Chairman’s den.

The Chairman stood up to greet the American guests. While photographers took pictures, he shook hands and exchanged brief greetings with each of the following: President Ford, Mrs. Ford, Susan Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Bush, Mr. Scowcroft, Under Secretary Sisco, Assistant Secretary Habib, Mr. Lord, and Mr. Solomon. After these greetings and pictures, the American guests left the room except for President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Bush, Mr. Scowcroft, and Mr. Lord. The Chinese officials present were those listed above. The group sat in a semi-circle on large arm chairs and the conversation began.)

Chairman Mao: So how are you?
President Ford: Fine. I hope you are too.
Chairman Mao: I am not well. I am sick.
President Ford: I think you look very well, Sir.
Chairman Mao: My appearance is not so bad. And how is Mr. Secretary of State?
Secretary Kissinger: I am very well. I am happy to be here.
Chairman Mao: And how are all the other American friends?
President Ford: They are all very healthy. We had a very good discussion this morning, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Mao: So what did you discuss?
President Ford: We discussed the problems we have with the Soviet Union and the need to have parallel actions as we look at the overall circumstances internationally, the need for your country and mine to work in parallel to achieve what is good for both of us.

Chairman Mao: We do not have much ability. We can only fire such empty cannons.
President Ford: I do not believe that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Mao: With regard to cursing, we have some ability in that respect.
President Ford: We can too.
Chairman Mao: And you also? Then we shall reach an agreement.
President Ford: We can also use force against a country which causes much trouble.
Chairman Mao: That is not bad. Then we have reached another agreement.
President Ford: We were very specific this morning in discussing whom we were talking about.
Chairman Mao: It can be none other but the Socialist Imperialists.
President Ford: There was some strong language used this morning, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Mao: (pointing to Teng) That is, you criticized him.
President Ford: We strongly criticized another country.
Chairman Mao: The one in the North.
President Ford: Yes.
Chairman Mao: Your Secretary of State has been interfering in my internal affairs.
President Ford: Tell me about it.

Chairman Mao: He does not allow me to go and meet God. He even tells me to disobey the order that God has given to me. God has sent me an invitation, yet he (Secretary Kissinger) says, don’t go.
Secretary Kissinger: That would be too powerful a combination if he went there.
Chairman Mao: He is an atheist (Secretary Kissinger). He is opposed to God. And he is also undermining my relations with God. He is a very ferocious man and I have no other recourse than to obey his orders.
Secretary Kissinger: We are very glad.
Chairman Mao: Yes indeed. I have no other way out, no way at all. He gave an order (Secretary Kissinger).
President Ford: To God?
Chairman Mao: No, to me.
(Chairman Mao speaks with Ambassador Huang in Chinese.) How are things going, Mr. Huang Chen? Are you still going back (to the United States)?
Ambassador Huang: I listen to the Chairman’s instructions.

Chairman Mao: Mr. President, do you want him?
President Ford: We certainly want him back. Our relationship has been excellent. It is important that the Ambassador be back and that Mr. Bush be here in Peking.
Chairman Mao: (to Ambassador Bush) Are you staying?
Ambassador Bush: Just a few days.
Chairman Mao: You have been promoted.
President Ford: Yes, he has been. We are going to submit a name for a replacement within a month.
Chairman Mao: We are reluctant to let him go.
President Ford: He is an outstanding person and that is why I have asked him to come back to the United States. But we will replace him with an equally good man.
Chairman Mao: That would be good. And it seems to me that it will also be better for Huang Chen to go back to the United States.
Ambassador Huang: I will firmly carry out the Chairman’s instructions. I do want to come back (to China) because I have been abroad too long. But I will do what the Chairman says.
Chairman Mao: You should stay there one or two years more.
Ambassador Huang: All right, I definitely will go back and firmly carry out the Chairman’s instructions.
Chairman Mao: There are some young people who have some criticism about him (Ambassador Huang). And these two (Wang and Tang) also have some criticism of Lord Chiao. And these people are not to be trifled with. Otherwise, you will suffer at their hands—that is, a civil war. There are now many big character posters out. And you perhaps can go to Tsinghua University and Peking University to have a look at them.

President Ford: I would not understand the signs. I hope your telling the Ambassador to stay two more years means
that we are going to continue the good relations between our two countries, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Mao: Yes. Yes, relations between our two countries should continue. It seems to me at present there is nothing very much between our two countries, your country and mine. Probably this year, next year, and the year after there will not be anything great happening between our two countries. Perhaps afterwards the situation might become a bit better.

President Ford: In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, I think we have to work in trying to achieve better coordination on the international scene, with emphasis on the challenges from some countries such as the Soviet Union.
Chairman Mao: Yes. Anyway we have no confidence in the Soviet Union. And Teng Hsiao-P’ing does not like the Soviet Union either.

President Ford: We have similar feelings as to their overall designs to expand on a worldwide basis—territorially, economically and otherwise. But we are going to meet the challenge.
Chairman Mao: Good. We are also going to meet their challenge.
President Ford: We expect on a bilateral basis, Mr. Chairman, to improve our relations after next year. We think that is the time real progress can be made on a bilateral basis.
Chairman Mao: You mean between us?
President Ford: Yes.
Chairman Mao: That would be good.
President Ford: In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, if your country and mine work to meet the challenge, in the East and West, from the Soviet Union, it will develop greater support in the United States toward continued progress for normalization between the United States and the People’s Republic.
Chairman Mao: Good. Anyway, this is just talk. And how the Soviet Union will actually act is something we will still have to wait and see.
President Ford: Mr. Chairman, in the meantime we will have to convince the Soviet Union by what is done by the United States and the People’s Republic—not words, but backed up by action. We will continue to keep the pressure on them. I hope the pressure from the East will be strong like our actions on our side.
Chairman Mao: Just firing of some empty cannon, cursing.
President Ford: We will do more than that, Mr. Chairman, as we have in the past. And the American people expect their President to be firm. We have, and we will in the future. More than words and more than empty cannons.
Chairman Mao: So you have solid cannons?
President Ford: Yes, and we will keep our powder dry unless they seek to challenge us, and then it will not be kept dry.
Chairman Mao: That is all right. That will not be bad. Yes, now you peacefully coexist.
President Ford: But that does not mean that we will not meet a challenge of any expansionist country. As a matter of fact we have met those challenges and will continue to do so.

Chairman Mao: That is good. Shall we reach an agreement?
President Ford: (nodding yes) And we can with an effort that achieves the same result. You put pressure from the East, and we will put on pressure from the West.
Chairman Mao: Yes. A gentlemen’s agreement.
President Ford: That is the best way to achieve success against a person who is not a gentleman.

Chairman Mao: They are not gentlemen.
President Ford: Those are kinder words than we used this morning.
Chairman Mao: I thank Mr. President very much for having come to see me. And I hope that in the future our two countries can be friendly to each other. ...

Visit Foreign Relations of the United States: China, 1973–1976 Website

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity.

The series, which is produced by the State Department's Office of the Historian, began in 1861 and now comprises more than 350 individual volumes. The volumes published over the last two decades increasingly contain declassified records from all the foreign affairs agencies.

Foreign Relations volumes contain documents from Presidential libraries, Departments of State and Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and other foreign affairs agencies as well as the private papers of individuals involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy.

In general, the editors choose documentation that illuminates policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution.  Volumes published over the past few years have expanded the scope of the series in two important ways:  first by including documents from a wider range of government agencies, particularly those involved with intelligence activity and covert actions, and second by including transcripts prepared from Presidential tape recordings.

A staff of approximately 20 historians and editors at the Office of the Historian in the Department of State compile and prepare the volumes for publication.  Agencies whose documents are included in a volume participate in a declassification review.

The Office can appeal the results of these reviews in an effort to release as much material as possible. The Office receives guidance from the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, a group of distinguished scholars from outside the U.S. Government.  The Committee meets four times a year to review progress and make recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series.  

Comments (0)

Show/Hide comments

Name

Email

Website

Title

Comment

smaller | bigger

Add Comment