The Department of State released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971. This volume, part of the ongoing official record of U.S. foreign policy, presents key documentation on the Nixon Administration's policy immediately prior to and during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. Included in this volume is full coverage of the "tilt" toward Pakistan by President Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger.

The volume begins with the political crisis triggered by the electoral success of Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan, led by Sheik Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League, and the announcement by President Yahya Khan on March 1, 1971, that the scheduled meetings of the newly elected National Assembly would be postponed indefinitely.

The announcement was met initially by popular demonstrations by the Awami League and the dispatch of additional troops to Dacca by Pakistan’s martial-law government. On March 15, Rahman announced that he was taking over the administration of East Pakistan. Ten days later the army arrested him and moved to suppress what it viewed as a secessionist movement. The United States was loath to intervene in Pakistan’s internal affairs, especially since Pakistan was Nixon’s secret conduit for a diplomatic opening to the People’s Republic of China.

The Pakistani army’s campaign against Bengali dissidents eventually led the U.S. Consulate in Dacca to send a "dissent channel" message to Washington, which called for the United States to condemn the "indiscriminate killing." However, the Nixon Administration was not prepared to involve itself in a civil war on the Indian subcontinent. Nor did the Nixon Administration pay much attention to Indian concerns about "the carnage in East Pakistan" and the problems of refugees in West Bengal. When Indian officials such as Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi came to Washington, the Nixon Administration counseled non-intervention, but assumed that India planned to go to war.

On November 22, India launched an offensive against East Pakistan. The Nixon Administration cut off economic aid to India, and Nixon himself decided to "tilt" toward Pakistan. This pro-Pakistan policy included support of Pakistan in the United Nations and pressure on the Soviets to discourage India, with accompanying hints that U.S.-Soviet détente would be in jeopardy if Moscow did not comply. When Nixon learned that Indian war plans were designed to liberate "Bangladesh" and southern Kashmir, and to destroy Pakistan’s military armored and air strength, he ordered the U.S. carrier Enterprise and its escorts into the Bay of Bengal. At the President’s instruction, Kissinger met with People's Republic of China Ambassador to the United Nations Huang Hua to brief him on the crisis and U.S. actions, and to suggest that China make military moves in support of Pakistan. The implication conveyed by Kissinger was that if the Soviet Union responded militarily, the United States would support China in any confrontation with the Soviet Union.

When the Chinese asked to meet with Kissinger in New York 2 days later, the White House assumed the worst and concluded that China had already decided to take military action against India. There was serious contemplation in the White House that the crisis might lead to nuclear war, but the general conclusion was that a regional conventional war in South Asia pitting India and the Soviet Union against China, the United States, and Pakistan was more likely. When the meeting took place, the Nixon White House learned that China’s message had nothing to do with military moves in support of Pakistan. For his part, President Nixon correctly realized that "Russia and China aren’t going to war." In mid-December, Pakistani military forces surrendered in East Pakistan. With U.S. encouragement, Pakistan accepted an Indian cease-fire offer that would dramatically alter the Indian subcontinent.

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Editor Louis J. Smith
General Editor Edward C. Keefer

Preface:

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subseries presents a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the administrations of Presidents Nixon and Ford. This volume documents the response of the United States to the crisis that developed in South Asia in 1971.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XI

The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970- October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971.

Additional documentation on the crisis in South Asia is published in the companion electronic volume, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972. The electronic volume incorporates a number of lengthy documents, such as intelligence assessments of the crisis, responses to National Security Study Memoranda prepared for the Washington Special Actions Group, and full transcripts of taped conversations. The electronic volume also covers United States relations with India and Pakistan in the period leading up to the crisis, and in the aftermath of the crisis. The volume includes compilations on Afghanistan and on the decision to recognize and offer assistance to the new nation of Bangladesh.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Information Response Branch of the Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as Amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.
The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The final declassification review of this volume, which began in 2002 and was completed in 2003, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 9 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 34 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an accurate account of the response of the Nixon administration to the crisis in South Asia in 1971.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland.

The editors wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access.

Louis J. Smith collected the documentation for this volume and selected and edited it, under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Gabrielle Mallon prepared the lists of names, sources, and abbreviations. Vicki E. Futscher and Kristin L. Ahlberg did the copy and technical editing, and Susan C. Weetman coordinated the declassification review. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

Marc J. Susser
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
March 2005

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South Asia Crisis, 1971

1. Editorial Note

According to Henry Kissinger, “When the Nixon administration took office, our policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite simply, to avoid adding another complication to our agenda.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 848) As events developed in South Asia, that proved to be an increasingly difficult objective to achieve. A political crisis developed in Pakistan out of Bengali demands for autonomy for East Pakistan, demands which were highlighted by the results of a general election in December 1970. The subsequent crisis, which roiled the subcontinent in conflict from March to December 1971, led to warfare between India and Pakistan, and eventuated in the transition of the east wing of Pakistan into the new nation of Bangladesh.

The United States, which was using Pakistan at the time as a conduit in conducting secret negotiations with China, intervened in the crisis to try to prevent fighting between India and Pakistan. When fighting developed, the Nixon administration “tilted” toward Pakistan.

The background to the crisis in Pakistan, and the developing tensions between the United States and India are documented in a companion Internet publication, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972. This publication also documents such bilateral issues as economic and military assistance as well as the aftermath of the crisis.

In 1972 the Nixon administration had to weigh the timing of recognition of the new government in Dacca, a decision that bore on relations with Pakistan, and reestablish a working relationship with India, as the dominant power on the subcontinent. Separate internet publications document relations with Afghanistan and with Bangladesh. ...

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