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 In the wake of September 11 through the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a key tenet of U.S. foreign policy has been that promoting democracy in the Arab world is an important strategy in reducing terrorism; at the same time, some policymakers and analysts have held that democracy has nothing to do with terrorism — or even that the growth of democracy in the Middle East may exacerbate political violence. However, scant empirical evidence links democracy to terrorism, positively or negatively.
This study examines whether such links exist by exploring the effects of liberalization processes on political violence in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco from 1991 to 2006. Drawing on data on the incidence of terrorist violence, extensive fieldwork and interviews in each of the six countries, and primary and secondary literature from and about each country, Kaye et al. find that political reforms have, in some instances, helped to marginalize and undercut extremist actors, but that these effects tend to be short-lived if reforms fail to produce tangible results.
Moreover, when regimes backtrack on even limited openings, the risks of instability and violence increase.
Summary
Many policymakers and analysts across the political spectrum consider democracy promotion an important element of a counterterrorism strategy. Yet others have argued that democracy can do little to stop terrorism and may even make the situation worse, particularly in unstable regions such as the Middle East. But neither side of this debate has moved far beyond unexamined assumptions and unsupported assertions; scant empirical evidence links democracy to terrorism, positively or negatively. This study examines whether such links exist by exploring cases from the Arab world—the region that inspired this debate in the first place.
This study examines how the process of political reform influences calculations regarding political violence in six Arab states. It is not a study of the relationship between fully functioning democracies and terrorism, because democracy and, arguably, genuine democratization are still absent in the Arab world today. This is also not a study about the causes of terrorism or how to end terrorism, as we recognize that the sources of terrorism are complex and multifaceted, and no one antidote is likely to address entirely its root causes.
Rather, our goal is to assess whether and how political liberalization and related civil liberties (or their absence) have affected the resort to and/or support for terrorism. Has the introduction of political reforms into the Arab Middle East alleviated terrorism and violent extremism? If so, in what ways and under what conditions? If not, why? Can the reversal of reforms and a return to repressive policies increase the risk of terrorism over time? In short, what are the effects of liberalization processes on political violence—immediate and delayed—in this critical area of the world? ...
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By: Dalia Dassa Kaye, Frederic Wehrey, Audra K. Grant, Dale Stahl
Publisher: Rand Corporation
Published: September 30, 2008
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0833045083
ISBN-13: 978-0833045089
CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxix
CHAPTER ONE
“Democracy” and Terrorism in the Arab World: A Frameworkfor Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Democracy in the Middle East: “Liberalized Autocracies” or Genuine
Democratization? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Understanding Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Democracy-Terrorism Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Post-9/11 “Draining the Swamp” Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Democracy Backlash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Democracy-Terrorism Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Empirical Application to the Arab World: Case Selection and
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CHAPTER TWO
Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Liberalization in the Mubarak Era . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Trends in Violent Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Comparing Levels of Freedom and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Assessing Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Repression and Destabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
CHAPTER THREE
Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Liberalization Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Trends in Violent Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Comparing Levels of Freedom and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Assessing Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Normative Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Institutional Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
CHAPTER FOUR
Bahrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Liberalization Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Trends in Violent Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Comparing Levels of Freedom and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Assessing Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Perceptions of Regime Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Norms of Tolerance and Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Institutional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Conclusions and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
CHAPTER FIVE
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Liberalization Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Trends in Violent Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 108
Comparing Levels of Freedom and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Assessing Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Regime Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Normative and Institutional Effects: The Municipal Council Elections . . . . . . 116
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
CHAPTER SIX
Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Trends in Liberalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Trends in Violent Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 126
Comparing Levels of Freedom and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 130
Assessing Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Institutional Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 132
Normative Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
The Effects of State Actions on Perceptions of Regime Legitimacy . . . . 139
Summary and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
CHAPTER SEVEN
Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Trends in Liberalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Trends in Violent Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Comparing Levels of Freedom and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Assessing Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Institutional Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Normative Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 158
Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 163
Liberalization in the Arab World Can Both Contain and Exacerbate
Political Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Policy Implications: A Return to Realism or Realistic Democracy
Promotion? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
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