Even as European concern over Russia’s efforts to use its energy resources for political leverage grows, European demand for gas is itself growing at a rate that can be satisfied only with substantial additional imports from Russia or, alternatively, a major new arrangement with Iran—something troubling to many Americans.

At the same time, poor understanding in the United States of Russian conduct and European constraints feeds a highly politicized debate that often produces weak, irrelevant, or even dangerous policy proposals. A more sophisticated approach will be required to advance American and European interests.

Russia is likely to continue its assertive foreign energy policy—and foreign policy—after President Putin steps down from the presidency. However, Russian motives are far more complex than one might think from reading op-ed pages in major newspapers, and the goals of government officials, company managers, and other key political actors are not always identical or even coordinated. Some objectives—like additional profits—are not so different from the goals of Western firms. And while Russia’s vast oil and gas reserves have given the Kremlin new confidence, Russia’s heavy reliance on its “energy power” ultimately demonstrates the weakness of a state that has few other useful foreign policy tools. While Moscow’s behavior has been troubling and should be resisted, it is also clear that Russia has tried applying heavy pressure only to relatively weak states along its periphery.

European nations must decide separately and collectively how to deal with these challenges and may well be most effective by pursuing the difficult but worthwhile task of putting their own house in order—developing common policies on energy and on Russia—rather than responding in a piecemeal fashion and exposing their differences. For its part, the U.S. should place the Russian challenge in the context of both U.S.-European relations and broader global dynamics in a period of high energy prices, growing demand, and political instability. Of course, America and Europe will be most effective in handling Russia if they do so together, on the basis of their substantial common interests.

Fear that American influence in Europe and elsewhere is waning during a difficult period is a major source of U.S. concern about Russian efforts to influence Europe or drive wedges into the U.S.-European relationship. But Washington can better address these issues by strengthening its ties with major European partners (and others around the globe) than by trying to persuade its allies not to buy energy that they need and cannot get elsewhere at reasonable prices. If the U.S. needs to compete with Moscow, it should compete politically, economically, culturally, and even militarily—all areas of great American advantage—and not over energy that Washington cannot supply.

Within Europe, the U.S. should deal separately with Moscow’s sometimes revisionist political aims and its legitimate economic and commercial goals. On both tracks, America should press for U.S.- Europe-Russia dialogue—in the former case, to try to develop and systematize a mutually acceptable role for Russia in Europe and in the latter case, to establish a common set of rules and dispute resolution procedures.

While offering strong and public support to all its NATO allies and other countries if threatened, and establishing clear red lines for Russian conduct, Washington should also quietly discourage Central European countries and non-NATO members in particular from provocative behavior intended to mobilize American support against Russia. Any economic dialogue should focus in part on the need for reciprocity in investment policies and on protections for foreign investors, something that Moscow should also want in the context of its highly politicized relationships with the U.S. and Europe, and American officials should vigorously defend U.S. companies operating in or working with Russia. (Executive Summary)

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Copyright 2008 The Nixon Center.
Russian Energy and European Security: A Transatlantic Dialogue
By Paul J. Saunders

The Nixon Center
1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1250
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 887-1000
Fax: (202) 887-5222
E-mail: mail@nixoncenter.org
Website: www.nixoncenter.org

FOREWORD

How to deal with the energy-rich and increasingly assertive Russia has become a source of considerable concern and debate in both the United States and Europe. It is beyond doubt that Russia’s new energy leverage represents a challenge to European energy security, European unity, and indeed Europe’s unique relationship with the United States.

Yet it is also beyond doubt that Europe needs and will continue to need Russian energy and that supplies from Russia are useful alternatives to reliance on the Persian Gulf, particularly Iran. Emotional characterizations Russian actions are not a substitute for a sober evaluation of actual Russian policies, U.S. and European interests, or principled but practical solutions.

Paul Saunders provides useful insight into American and European thinking about Russia’s aspirations and capabilities, the multifaceted realities of Europe’s energy dependence on Russia, the many perspectives on Russia within Europe, and how the United States can work effectively with key allies in Europe, and with Moscow, to address both energy security as well as wider U.S. and European interests. Saunders argues that there are red lines which Russia should not be allowed to cross, but he also suggests that the red lines should reflect important U.S. and European priorities rather than reflexive opposition rooted in zero-sum thinking.

His recommendations are tough-minded but realistic and policy-makers in the U.S. and Europe will benefit from his counsel.

Dimitri K. Simes
President
The Nixon Center

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Paul J. Saunders is Executive Director of The Nixon Center. In addition to being the Center’s chief operating officer, he directs its U.S.-Russian Relations Program and works on other issues, including energy and climate change, U.S.-European relations, and the role of democracy in U.S. foreign policy. He is also Associate Publisher of the foreign policy magazine The National Interest, published bi-monthly by The Nixon Center.

From 2003 to 2005, Mr. Saunders served as Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs. In that capacity, he worked on a broad range of transnational issues, especially with respect to Russia, Ukraine, and the former Soviet Union as well as Iraq, China and India.

From 1997 to 2003, Mr. Saunders served as Director of The Nixon Center; he was Assistant Director of the Center from its founding in 1994 until 1997. He has written extensively for major newspapers and journals and is a frequent commentator in national media, including CNN, Fox, and MSNBC. He is the author of Common Challenges: A U.S.-European-Japanese Dialogue on Energy Security and Climate Change and, with Geoffrey Kemp, America, Russia and the Greater Middle East: Challenges and Opportunities.

THE NIXON CENTER

The Nixon Center is a non-partisan public policy institution established by former President Richard Nixon shortly before his death in 1994.

Committed to the analysis of policy challenges to the United States through the prism of the American national interest, the Center is a substantively and programmatically independent division of the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation.

Major programs of The Nixon Center focus on energy security and climate, immigration and national security, regional strategy in the greater Middle East, and strategic studies, as well as U.S. relations with China, Europe and Russia. The Nixon Center also publishes the bimonthly foreign affairs magazine The National Interest.

The Center is supported by foundation, corporate and individual donors as well as by the Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation endowment.

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