For the first time in modern history, a rising China and a reemerging Japan are facing one another as East Asia’s preeminent powers. The choices Beijing and Tokyo make over the next few years regarding management of their bilateral relationship may well prove to be some of the most consequential for international order in the 21st century.

In early 2006, Sino-Japanese relations were close to a post–Cold War low, but following the retirement of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, relations have improved under his successor, Abe Shinzo. However, the sources of tension in the relationship are deeply rooted and will likely intensify over time unless addressed by political leaders.

Sources of tension include the unprecedented rise of both nations as Asian powers; the fact that neither Tokyo nor Beijing appears content to play a secondary role in Asia; questions about shared history that will continue to cast a long shadow over the bilateral relationship and will feed and be influenced by nationalism; and the disputes over East
China Sea resources, which have made the use of force a possibility—with consequences that could lead to conflict.

Mutual strategic suspicion clouds the relationship and involves the United States as well. China is especially troubled by Tokyo’s increasingly outspoken support of peaceful resolution with respect to Taiwan. Beijing believes that Taiwan has gone from being an implicit to an explicit focus of Japanese military policy and sees the updating and strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance as being directed at China.

Both countries are increasingly involved globally as stakeholders, which suggests that they have many interests in common. Mutual recognition of this reality may provide a way to bridge differences. To help this process along, U.S. policymakers should consider the following steps:

• Develop a national consensus about U.S. interests and policy objectives vis-à-vis the Sino-Japanese relationship, and/or amplify in policy initiatives and public pronouncements the theme of the 2006 National Security Strategy: that the United States seeks sound bilateral relations with both China and Japan as a basis for wider regional cooperation to advance security, prosperity, and freedom in East Asia. The United States has significant national interests at stake in its relations with both Japan and China, which could be affected by the evolution of relations between Tokyo and Beijing.

• Do not let Beijing or Tokyo think that the rivalry goes unnoticed in Washington. U.S. policy should make clear that Washington thinks the rivalry is dangerous. However, Washington should not be directly involved in the history debate, nor should it attempt to act as a go-between.

• Emphasize shared “stakeholdership” and responsible partnership by highlighting mutual interests, which include regional stability, access to energy, and dependence on maritime commerce. Promote trilateral cooperation.

• Encourage Japan and China to pursue better military-to-military relations; an incidents-at-sea agreement seems especially useful.

• Recognize that the United States cannot be totally even-handed. U.S. priorities are overwhelmingly inclined toward the U.S.-Japan alliance; however, Washington need not consequently sacrifice its interests in productive relations with China.

• Stay engaged in the discussion about Asia’s economic future through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and free trade agreements—both bilateral and, eventually, regional.

• Be prepared for a potential crisis to occur in the East China Sea. Also, understand the expectations that Tokyo and Beijing have of the United States in such a crisis.

• Continue to reassure Japan frequently. China also needs reassurance that U.S. intentions are not malign. Reaffirming that Washington is not trying to contain China or promote Taiwan’s independence is important.

• Consider dropping explicit official references to “hedging against China.” All countries hedge against the future. Talking about it in official documents suggests a policy of containment.

• Continue to act as a catalyst for improved trilateral U.S.–Japan–Republic of Korea (ROK) relations. Many of the problems in the Japan-China relationship also bedevil Japan-ROK relations.

Download Sino-Japanese Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy

PDF format, 162KB, 6Pages. INSS Special Report.

About This Report:

During 2006, a consortium of policy research organizations conducted an in-depth examination of the troubled Sino-Japanese relationship and the implications of those tensions for U.S. interests.

Chaired by James Kelly, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the project brought together a range of policy and regional experts to explore all aspects of the topic. Collaborating institutions included the Center for Naval Analyses, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the Pacific Forum/Center for Strategic and International Studies.

This report was authored by Michael McDevitt with contributions from James Przystup, Alan Romberg, Brad Roberts, Brad Glosserman, James Kelly, and Ralph Cossa. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their sponsoring organizations or the U.S. Department of Defense.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy research and strategic gaming organization within the National Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of international security affairs and defense studies. Through an active outreach program, including conferences and publications, INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic challenges and policy options.

The Special Report series presents original research by members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

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