The China Leadership Monitor seeks to inform the American foreign policy community about current trends in China's leadership politics and in its foreign and domestic policies.

The Monitor proceeds on the premise that as China's importance in international affairs grows, American policy-makers and the broader policy-interested public increasingly need analysis of politics among China's leadership that is accurate, comprehensive, systematic, current, and relevant to major areas of interest to the United States.

China Leadership Monitor analysis rests heavily on traditional China-watching methods of interpreting information in China's state-controlled media. Use of these methods was once universal among specialists in contemporary Chinese affairs.

Although the use of these methods has declined as opportunities to study China using other approaches have opened up in recent decades, their value in following politics among China's top leadership has not. Monitor analysis also brings to bear some of the new avenues of information and insight that have opened up since the normalization of U.S.-China relations and China's policy "opening to the outside world" in the late 1970s.

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The Chinese Military’s Earthquake Response Leadership Team
James Mulvenon

On 12 May, China was rocked by a 7.9 earthquake, epicentered just north of Chengdu in Sichuan Province. The People’s Liberation Army was quickly mobilized to deal with the national disaster, as it has been throughout the PRC’s history. This article examines the military leadership team involved in the earthquake rescue and recovery operation, assessing the implications of the natural disaster for the PLA’s domestic image, civil-military relations, and international posture.

Introduction

On 12 May, China was rocked by a 7.9 earthquake, epicentered just north of Chengdu in Sichuan Province. Between 50,000 and 100,000 people are estimated to have perished in the resulting destruction, which primarily occurred in mountainous terrain, greatly complicating relief efforts. According to official media, the military response to the earthquake was rapid, as the first Chinese military rescue team reportedly headed for the disaster area within 14 minutes after the strong earthquake began. Serendipitously, Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice-Chairman Guo Boxiong was inspecting units in nearby Kunming on the day of the quake. Accompanied by Ge Zhenfeng deputy chief of the general staff, and Wang Guanzhong, director of the CMC General Office, Guo reportedly took initial command of the situation, ordering units from the Air Force, Chengdu Military Region, Jinan Military Region and the Armed Police Force, as well as “a certain airborne unit,” to quickly proceed to the stricken areas to rescue quake victims.

Within a week, China’s armed forces had reportedly dispatched more than 100,000 soldiers and armed police to help with rescue operations in earthquake-hit areas, dividing their units into three geographical rescue zones.

Chinese propaganda organs provided the usual statistical information to support the contention that the PLA response was “orderly and efficient,” asserting that military transport aircraft and helicopters had made 1,069 flights during the first week of operations, supplemented by 92 military trains and about 110,000 military vehicles, cranes, rubber boats, portable communication devices, and power generators.3 The military units in question had allegedly pulled 21,566 people both dead and alive from the debris, treated 34,051 injured people and transferred 205,370 people to safety. A military spokesman claimed that 115 medical teams were sent to the disaster zone, and quilts, food, medicine, and tents weighing 780,000 tons were distributed. The armed forces also airdropped 307 tons of relief supplies and repaired 557 kilometers of damaged roads, he said.

Conclusions:

The devastating earthquake in Sichuan, which caused horrific human loss and suffering, has nonetheless also offered some fascinating silver linings. Foreign media accounts are filled with analyses of how the government’s response has erased some of the tensions from the earlier Tibet crackdown, renewed the confidence of the Chinese people in the effectiveness of the CCP’s governance, and even highlighted the positive spiritual effect of the crisis on China’s self-obsessed, materialist “Me” generation. Less discussed are the positive consequences for domestic perceptions of the PLA, civil-military relations and foreign military-to-military relations.

In terms of domestic perceptions, the PLA’s massive response to the earthquake reinforced its popularity among the Chinese people, building upon the positive imagery of the PLA’s efforts during the 1998 flood fighting and the 2007 ice and snow storm. For most of the population, these events have arguably erased most, if not all, of the taint from the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Instead, the PLA is now proudly seen as the nationalist vanguard of China’s emerging great power status. These positive perceptions were further reinforced by the relative transparency of the PLA’s response to the quake, which even the official media contrasted with the inadequate transparency of the PLA’s response to the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, the SARS epidemic, and its military crackdown in Tibet earlier in the year. There was widespread media coverage of the PLA’s relief effort, multiple press conferences, and public PLA command group meetings, prompting Central Military Commission Vice-Chair Xu Caihou to praise PLA journalists for the aggressiveness of their reporting.

In terms of civil-military relations, the PLA’s response to the quake also reinforced the perception of complete CCP control of the military and Hu Jintao’s unrivaled leadership of military affairs. As discussed earlier, the latter was particularly clear in the PLA’s prompt trumpeting of Hu’s 17 May instructions. For his part, Hu lavished praise upon the PLA:

On behalf of the CPC Central Committee, State Council, and Central Military Commission, I wish to extend my heartfelt regards to you . . . In the face of the deadly disaster, you have resolutely implemented the instructions of the CPC Central Committee, State Council, and Central Military Commission and firmly kept in mind that the disaster is an order and time is life. You have made great contributions by rushing to the frontline of the quake-hit areas and going all out, plunging into the struggle to combat the disaster and provide relief. You have used your practical action to let the masses of the disaster-stricken areas feel their hope, see their confidence, and increase their strength.

There was no external evidence of any shift in PLA allegiances to other Party leaders such as Wen Jiabao, despite the latter’s high profile during the crisis and his seemingly competing status with Hu Jintao.

Finally, the earthquake relief effort provided opportunities for China to deepen its military-to-military relations with other countries, including the United States. In the inaugural press conference of the Ministry of Defense’s Information Office, spokesman Hu Changming addressed an audience of 61 attachés from 47 countries, confirming that Beijing would welcome “aid and support from foreign governments, people and militaries to the areas affected by the quake in Sichuan.” Hu also sought to reinforce the image of PLA transparency in the process, asserting: “I believe you have seen a more open and confident Chinese military.” To underscore the point, the press conference was also attended by several other senior officers, including Major General Ma Jian, deputy director of the Operations Department of the General Staff Headquarters, Air Force Senior Colonel Cheng Junxiang, and the Armed Police headquarters’ Senior Colonel Zhang Jinliang, all of whom made public statements.

In terms of Sino-U.S. military-to-military relations, high-level contact was initiated in a phone call between Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ma Xiaotian and PACOM Commander Keating on 17 May, utilizing the newly established Defense Telephone Link (DTL).30 Shortly thereafter, a US military plane carrying more than $700,000 worth of aid landed in Chengdu, where it was greeted by U.S. defense attaché General Charles Hooper. In subsequent weeks, senior U.S. military leaders, including Secretary of Defense Gates, even publicly contrasted China’s relatively open response to outside offers of assistance with the feckless and murderous dallying by the Burmese junta after Cyclone Nargis.

Overall, the Chinese military’s relative openness and the swift response of U.S. forces to the disaster have created a positive atmosphere for Sino-U.S. military-to-military relations writ large, which hopefully the two sides will be able to build upon in the future.

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